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Russia may well rank highly in a relevant international rating of the formal attributes of performance-based budgeting (PBB). The Russian government has created the necessary preconditions for PBB – introducing a multi-year budget and accumulating data on performance indicators that are considered in the budget planning process. The new budget code draft currently under discussion proposes strengthening the link between the budget and programmes. However, the use of PBB tools is not a guarantee of success. The experience of many countries has demonstrated that the use of performance indicators in budget discussions, spending reviews, etc. is an essential but insufficient condition for an effective budget system. This fully applies to the Russian budgeting practices. On the one hand, Russia has introduced many PBB tools, ranging from presentational budgeting to direct budgeting. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the budget spending leaves much to be desired.
Performance Governance in the Russian Federation
Risk indicators of violation of mandatory requirements are a new enforcement and inspection tool in Russian legislation. Risk indicators were introduced in the legal field in 2016. Their practical application began only in 2018. The use of risk indicators began in business and financial management. In the field of inspection and supervisory activities, there is still no established practice for their use. In addition, no methodological documents were adopted that could assist the inspection authorities in applying risk indicators. The public administration science also lacks comprehensive work on the analysis of proper use of risk indicators. To eliminate these gaps, the authors analyzed legal acts on the use of risk indicators, studied the practice of using risk indicators and prepared proposals for improving approaches to their development in the future.
The article presents a comprehensive analysis of the inspections in the form of raids. It is concluded that raid is one of the forms of state control. The definition of raids is given. This form of control hadn't been regulated by law until 2014, but had been widely used. In 2014 the legislator established an opportunity for inspection authorities to conduct raids, but did not provide any procedural requirements for them. This situation leads to a disjointed law-enforcement practice. In doctrine, there is no complex analysis of raids. The available publications are related only to specific types of raids. Due to the lack of regulation and scientific researches, the authors carry out a system analysis of the introduction of raids in the inspection and supervision activities, and also identify the types of inspection and supervision activities, where raids are most often conducted. Based on the analysis of law-enforcement practice, the authors reveal and describe in detail a number of problems that arise during the conduct of raids. Each problem is illustrated by certain practices.
Industrial policy has always attracted significant attention in Russia among the political class, business people and experts. An essential element of industrial policy is the orientation toward redistribution of rents in the economy – that is, the regular prospect of different sectors and players receiving direct advantages or benefits and political advantages in the near and long term determines the attractiveness of industrial policy to various interest groups. In periods of economic growth industrial policy was considered as an instrument of diversification of Russian economy, reduction of its dependence on oil and gas exports, and accelerated development of high-tech manufacturing and services. In crises periods industrial policy was more focused on supporting some large and systemic industries (such as automotive industry in 2009).
However, in recent years this principle has become less universal: in spite of the crisis the Russian government is making efforts to develop new sectors of the economy on the basis of disruptive innovation (under the so-called National Technology Initiative).
Of course, this is not the only factor in the appeal of industrial policy in the Russian political landscape. Industrial policy, as a rule, is conceptually accepted and understood by Russian society – which is why politicians accord it especial attention. As is established, in Russia the paternalistic roots of state policy are strong, manifesting themselves in industrial policy. All the while, current social problems are front and centre by comparison with the strategic challenges of structural rebuilding, diversification and technological development of the Russian economy.
The possibility of appealing to the different interests of the population (including those associated with the perception of certain sectors of scientific and technological achievements of the Soviet period as key aspects of national pride) further strengthens the position of those who develop the industrial policy. Russian society has a better perception of dirigiste principles and personalised or ad hoc management – as a sign of pragmatism and personal responsibility – than of various institutional reforms. Indeed, over the last three decades, a certain distrust of institutional reforms (the results of which are often difficult for the public to assess) has set into Russian society.
Finally, industrial policy does not have its own instruments and actually comprises the mechanisms of various other policies. In relation to this, some experts try to tie or “bundle” industrial policy of one or other design together with certain necessary reforms in order to attract attention to this for politicians and support by society. Usually, in the discussion of industrial policy measures to develop competition, support SMEs, reduce administrative barriers, attract FDI, and protect property rights are proposed.
Purpose: the use of performance management (PM) tools is a defining characteristic of public sector management. However, while research on PM is extensive, comparatively little focuses on how the practice shapes the attitudes and behavior of employees. This article addresses this question and develops a conditional process model that links PM to turnover intention. The model predicts that the PM-turnover relationship is mediated by job satisfaction and moderated by job-goal alignment.
Design and methodology: We use a unique dataset drawn from the Russian public sector to test the model empirically. Conditional process modeling is used to test for moderated mediation. The effects are further explored using bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence intervals.
Findings: The analysis suggests that PM has an indirect effect on turnover intention via job satisfaction in the average case. However, the indirect effect is stronger for employees who perceive that their work contributes directly to organizational goals. In contrast, for employees whose work lacks organizational goal alignment, PM has no significant effect.
Originality: Despite being an instrument to manage organizational (including human) resources, few studies have linked PM to employee-level outcomes. By doing so, this study implies promising research paths that can help generate a more complete picture of how PM shapes organizational processes in the public sector.